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Abstract. In this paper we show that the price of stability of Shapley
network design games on undirected graphs with k players is at most
k3(k+1)/2−k2
1+k3(k+1)/2−k2Hk =
(
1−Θ(1/k4))Hk, where Hk denotes the k-th har-
monic number. This improves on the known upper bound of Hk, which
is also valid for directed graphs but for these, in contrast, is tight. Hence,
we give the first non-trivial upper bound on the price of stability for
undirected Shapley network design games that is valid for an arbitrary
number of players. Our bound is proved by analyzing the price of sta-
bility restricted to Nash equilibria that minimize the potential function
of the game. We also present a game with k = 3 players in which such
a restricted price of stability is 1.634. This shows that the analysis of
Bilo` and Bove (Journal of Interconnection Networks, Volume 12, 2011)
is tight. In addition, we give an example for three players that improves
the lower bound on the (unrestricted) price of stability to 1.571.
Keywords: undirected Shapley network design game, price of stability,
potential-optimal price of stability, potential-optimal price of anarchy
1 Introduction
Infrastructure networks are the lifelines of our civilization. Through generations a
tremendous effort has been undertaken to cover the earth’s surface with irrigation
canal systems, sewage lines, road networks, railways, and – more recently – data
networks. Some of these infrastructures are initiated and planned by a central
authority that designs the network and decides on its topology and dimension.
Many networks, however, arise as an outcome of actions of selfish individuals who
are motivated by their own connectivity requirements rather than by optimizing
the overall network design. A prominent example of the latter phenomenon is the
rise of the Internet. In order to quantify the efficiency of networks, it is crucial
to understand the processes that govern their formation. Anshelevich et al. [1]
proposed a particularly elegant model for such processes, which is now known
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as the Shapley network design game or the network design game with fair cost
allocation (for an overview of other models for network formation, see [2]).
The Shapley network design game is played by k players 1, 2, . . . , k on a graph
G = (V,E) with positive edge-costs ce ∈ N. Each player i has associated with it
a source-target pair si, ti ∈ V of vertices that she needs to connect with a simple
path in G. The choice of such a path is called a strategy of the player, and a
collection consisting of one strategy for each player is called a strategy profile. The
cost ce of every edge e is shared equally among the players using it. Each player
i aims at choosing a path of smallest possible (individual) cost to herself. This
cost is defined as the sum of the cost shares for player i along the path. Players
are selfish in that they only care about their own costs. In particular, they do
not care about the social cost, defined as the sum of all players’ individual costs
and denoted by cost(P ) for a strategy profile P .
A Nash equilibrium of a Shapley network design game is a strategy profile in
which no player i can switch to an si-ti path that yields her a smaller individual
cost. To quantify the effect of the selfish behavior, it is natural to compare the
social cost of a Nash equilibrium of the game with the smallest social cost among
all possible strategy profiles [1,2]. Several quantifications of selfish behavior have
been studied, based on whether we restrict ourselves to a specific set of Nash
equilibria, and whether we compare the worst or best such equilibrium in terms of
social cost. In this paper, we adopt the notion of the price of stability, introduced
by Anshelevich et al. [1]. Denoting by N the set of all Nash equilibria and by O
a strategy profile that minimizes the social cost of a game, the price of stability
of the game is defined as the ratio minN∈N cost(N)/cost(O).
Anshelevich et al. [1] observed that Shapley network design games always have
a Nash equilibrium by showing that they belong to the class of congestion games.
For these games, the existence of a Nash equilibrium is always guaranteed, as
shown by Rosenthal [3]. Rosenthal’s existence proof relies on a potential function
argument. That is, he showed that there exists a function Φ that maps strategy
profiles to real numbers and has the property that if any one player changes her
strategy unilaterally, then the value of Φ changes by the exact same value as the
cost of the player. This observation, together with the finiteness of the space of all
strategy profiles, implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium. In particular, any
potential minimum, i.e., a strategy profile that globally minimizes the potential
function, is a Nash equilibrium. The potential function of a game is unique up to
an additive constant (see Monderer and Shapley [4]). Using the special form of
the potential function for Shapley network design games, Anshelevich et al. [1]
showed that the price of stability of any game is at most Hk =
∑k
i=1
1
i , the k-th
harmonic number (which is of order log k). This upper bound is tight for games
played on directed graphs. That is, there are Shapley network design games on
directed graphs [1] for which the price of stability is arbitrarily close to Hk.
The situation is different for undirected Shapley network design games, i.e.,
games played on undirected graphs. As the same potential arguments remain valid,
the price of stability of any game is still at most Hk. Yet, the largest known price
of stability (asymptotically) is a constant, more precisely 348/155 ≈ 2.245 (see
Bilo` et al. [5]). This leaves the question of the worst-possible price of stability in
undirected Shapley network design games with k players wide open. Remarkably,
the largest known price of stability, as provided by Bilo` et al., does not come
from a simple example, but from a complicated construction. Previously known
worst-case games had a price of stability of 4/3 ≈ 1.333 [1], 12/7 ≈ 1.714 [6], and
42/23 ≈ 1.8261 [7]. Despite numerous attempts [8,1,5,6,7,9] to narrow the gap
of the bounds on the price of stability, there has been little progress in terms
of numerical results. It is generally believed that the price of stability is smaller
than Hk, and we confirm this belief in this paper. For small values of k some
smaller upper bounds are known. For k = 2 players, the price of stability is at
most 4/3 < H2 = 3/2 and this is tight [1,7]. Bilo` and Bove [8] analyzed the case
of k = 3 players and showed that the price of stability of any such game is at
most 1.634 < H3 = 1.833¯. For this case, however, a considerable gap remains,
as the worst example known has a price of stability of 74/48 ≈ 1.542 [7]. Thus,
already for k = 3 players, the exact worst-case price of stability is unknown.
For several special cases, one can derive better upper bounds on the price of
stability. If all players share the same terminal then the price of stability is at
most O(log k/ log log k) [9]. If in addition every vertex is the source of at least
one player, then the price of stability further degrades to O(log log k) [6].
Many of the mentioned upper bounds are not only valid for the best Nash
equilibrium of a game, but also for a very specific one – the potential minimum.
Potential minima have desirable stability properties. For example, they are
reached by certain learning dynamics for players that do not always play rationally
(see Blume [10]). This motivates to explicitly study the ratio between the cost
of a potential minimum and that of a profile minimizing the social cost – a
social optimum. To stress the described stability properties of potential minima,
Asadpour and Saberi [11] called this ratio the inefficiency ratio of stable equilibria.
Kawase and Makino [12] called the very same ratio the potential-optimal price
of anarchy. They also define the potential-optimal price of stability of a game
in the obvious way as the ratio between the cost of a best potential minimum
and that of a social optimum. They prove that the potential-optimal price of
anarchy of undirected Shapley network design games is at most O(
√
log k) for
the special case where all players share the same terminal node, and where every
vertex is the source of at least one player. They give a construction of a game
with potential-optimal price of anarchy Ω(
√
log log k).
Our Contribution
Our main result shows that the price of stability in undirected Shapley network
design games is at most k
3(k+1)/2−k2
1+k3(k+1)/2−k2Hk = (1 − Θ(1/k4))Hk. Thus, we pro-
vide the first general upper bound that shows that the price of stability for k
players is strictly smaller than Hk. To prove this upper bound, we generalize
the techniques of Christodoulou et al. [7] to any number of players. In short,
similar to Christodoulou et al., we obtain a set of inequalities relating the cost of
any Nash equilibrium to the cost of a social optimum. We then combine these
in a non-trivial way to obtain the claimed upper bound, additionally assuming
that the Nash equilibrium has a smaller potential than the social optimum.
Interestingly, the resulting upper bound is tight for the case of k = 2 players.
As an additional contribution, we provide an example of a game with k = 3
players in which the potential-optimal price of stability is 1.634. Thus, we show
that the upper bound on the potential-optimal price of anarchy given by Bilo`
and Bove [8] is tight. This result implies that for three players the upper bound
on the price of stability cannot be further improved via potential-minimizers.
This is in contrast to the directed case, for which a simple inequality relates the
cost of the potential minimum to that of a social optimum, giving a tight bound
on the price of stability. We believe that this observation provides an insight as
to why the undirected case is much harder to tackle than the directed one.
We note that in our tight example for the potential-optimal price of stabil-
ity/anarchy, the social optimum is also a Nash equilibrium, and thus the example
provides no new lower bounds on the price of stability. Our third contribution
however is a new lower bound on the price of stability. We provide an example of
a game with three players and price of stability 1.571, which improves on the
previous best lower bound of 74/48 ≈ 1.542 [7].
2 Problem Definition and Preliminaries
Let G = (V,E) be an undirected graph with a positive cost ce > 0 for every edge
e ∈ E. The Shapley network design game is a strategic game of k players. Every
player i ∈ {1, . . . , k} has a dedicated pair of vertices si, ti ∈ V , that we call her
source and target, respectively. The strategy space of player i is the collection Pi
of all paths Pi ⊆ E between si and ti. Every such path Pi is called a strategy. A
strategy profile P is a tuple (P1, . . . , Pk) of k strategies, Pi ∈ Pi. Given a strategy
profile P , we say that player i plays strategy Pi in P . The cost to player i in a
strategy profile P = (P1, . . . , Pk) is
costi(P ) =
∑
e∈Pi
ce
ke
,
where ke denotes the number of paths Pi in P such that e ∈ Pi. That is, ke is
the number of players that use edge e. The goal of every player is to minimize
her cost. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile N = (N1, . . . ,Nk), Ni ∈ Pi,
such that no player i can improve her cost by playing a different strategy. That
is, for every i and every N′i ∈ Pi, it holds that costi(N) ≤ costi(N ′i , N−i), where
(N ′i , N−i) is a shorthand for (N1, . . . ,Ni−1,N
′
i,Ni+1, . . . ,Nk). With a slight abuse
of terminology we will identify the game played on the graph G with the graph
itself and we write N (G) to denote the set of Nash equilibria of G.
Observe that the edges of any strategy profile P induce a graph (V,∪iPi),
which we call the underlying network. We denote the edge set of this graph
by E(P ). The social cost, or simply the cost of a strategy profile P , denoted
as cost(P ), is the sum of the players’ individual costs. Observe that the social
cost is equal to the total cost of the edges in the played strategies, i.e.,
cost(P ) =
k∑
i=1
costi(P ) =
∑
e∈E(P )
ce.
A strategy profile that minimizes the social cost is called the social optimum.
The price of stability of a game G, denoted by PoS(G), is defined as the cost of
the best Nash equilibrium of G divided by the cost of a social optimum O(G)
of G. That is, PoS(G) = minN∈N (G) cost(N)/cost(O(G)). The price of anarchy
of G, PoA(G) for short, is obtained by replacing min by max in this definition.
A Shapley network design game is a potential game [1,3]. That is, there is a
function Φ : P1 × . . .×Pk → R such that, for every strategy profile P , whenever
any player i changes her strategy from Pi to P
′
i , then costi(P )− costi(P ′i , P−i) =
Φ(P )− Φ(P ′i , P−i). Rosenthal’s (exact) potential function has the form
Φ(P ) =
∑
e∈E(P )
ke∑
i=1
ce
i
=
∑
e∈E(P )
Hke · ce,
where Hj denotes the j-th Harmonic number
∑j
i=1
1
i . The potential function is
unique up to an additive constant [4].
Motivated by the particular stability properties of potential minima, Kawase
and Makino [12] introduced two notions to quantify the inefficiency of potential
minimizers. For a game G let F(G) denote the set of potential minimizers
of G, i.e., strategy profiles of G that minimize the potential function of G.
The potential-optimal price of stability of G is then defined as POPoS(G) =
minN∈F(G) cost(N)/cost(O(G)) and the potential-optimal price of anarchy is
defined as POPoA(G) = maxN∈F(G) cost(N)/cost(O(G)). Since F(G) ⊆ N (G),
clearly, for any game G,
PoS(G) ≤ POPoS(G) ≤ POPoA(G) ≤ PoA(G).
For a fixed number of players k ≥ 2, we are interested to bound the worst-case
price of stability of games with k players. For a formal definition, let G(k) denote
the set of all games with k players. The price of stability of undirected Shapley
network design games with k players is defined as PoS(k) = supG∈G(k) PoS(G).
POPoS(k) and POPoA(k) are defined analogously.
Using Rosenthal’s potential function Φ, we can bound the potential-optimal
price of anarchy (and, thus, the price of stability) from above by Hk as fol-
lows (cf. [1]). Let O be a social optimum. For a potential minimum N, we have
Φ(N) ≤ Φ(O). Using this together with cost(N) ≤ Φ(N) and Φ(O) ≤ Hk · cost(O)
we obtain cost(N) ≤ Hk · cost(O), as claimed.
We define Ni and Oi, for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, to be the sets of edges of N and O
that are used by exactly i players, respectively. Thus, E(N) =
⋃k
i=1 N
i and
E(O) =
⋃k
i=1 O
i. For a set of edges M ⊆ E, we will denote by |M | the to-
tal cost of the edges in M , i.e., |M | = ∑e∈M ce. This allows us to express
the value of the potential function for N and O by Φ(N) =
∑k
j=1Hj |Nj | and
Φ(O) =
∑k
j=1Hj |Oj |, respectively.
3 A General Upper Bound
In this section we derive an upper bound on the price of stability of any undi-
rected Shapley network design game. The main idea to show our upper bound
follows that of Christodoulou et al. [7], which they used for deriving an upper
bound of 33/20 = 1.65 for the case of k = 3 players. By the definition of Nash
equilibria, no player can change her chosen si-ti path in such a profile and
thereby improve her cost. We will consider a specific change of strategy for each
player, which gives us an inequality that relates the costs of the edges used in
the Nash equilibrium to those used in the social optimum. We then combine this
inequality in a non-trivial way with another that is gained from the fact that
we consider a potential minimum. This allows us to obtain an upper bound of
k3(k+1)/2−k2
1+k3(k+1)/2−k2Hk = (1−Θ(1/k4))Hk on the price of stability.
Consider a Nash equilibrium N and a social optimum O of a given Shapley
network design game with k players. In undirected graphs, if Ok is non-empty any
player i can use paths in the underlying network of the optimum O to connect
its terminals to the source and the target of another player j. By additionally
using the path of player j in the Nash equilibrium N, we obtain a valid strategy
for player i. This is the specific alternative strategy of player i which we use to
relate the cost of the Nash equilibrium to the social optimum.
We will additionally use the following observation about the structure of
social optima. Observe that any social optimum O forms a forest (because from
any cycle we could remove an edge and thereby decrease the cost). If Ok is
non-empty, i.e., some edges are shared among all players in the optimum, the
edges of E(O) \ Ok form two trees such that every player has one terminal in
each of the trees. Let O+ denote the edge set of the larger tree, and O− denote
the edge set of the smaller one (measured in terms of the social cost). We have
O+ ∪ O− = E(O) \ Ok and, by the definition, |O+| ≥ |O−|. Every tree has a
closed walk that visits every vertex at least once and every edge exactly twice
(for example, a depth-first traversal). We consider such a walk in the tree given
by the edges in O+, and use it to order the players. Without loss of generality, if
Ok 6= ∅, the players are numbered such that there is a closed walk in O+ that
visits the terminals in the order given by the players’ numbers, while using each
edge exactly twice. We say that the players are in major-tree order.
Consider the edges of a Nash equilibrium which are not used by all k players.
The following lemma bounds the cost of these edges with respect to the cost of a
social optimum.
Lemma 1. Given a game G, let N = (N1, . . . ,Nk) be a Nash equilibrium and
O = (O1, . . . ,Ok) a social optimum with O
k 6= ∅. Then,
k−1∑
j=1
|Nj | ≤ (k2(k + 1)/2− k)
k−1∑
j=1
|Oj |.
si ti
Q
+
i u v Q
−
i
si+1 ti+1
Oi
Oi+1
Oi
Oi+1
Oi ∩ Oi+1
Ni+1
Fig. 1. Constructing the path Pi with Oi, Oi+1, Ni+1 (dashed line), and Qi (continuous
lines). Note that Oi ∩Oi+1 (dotted line) is not part of Pi.
Proof. For every player i, we construct an si-ti path Pi (cf. Figure 1) with the prop-
erty that every edge on Pi is either in Ni+1 or not in O
k. In the following we under-
stand indices modulo k, i.e. k+1 ≡ 1 and 0 ≡ k. Let u, v be the first and last vertex
on Oi that are also on Oi+1. These vertices are well defined as O
k is non-empty,
and thus Oi∩Oi+1 is non-empty. Assume that u lies before v on Oi+1 (otherwise,
exchange si+1 and ti+1 in the following). Let Pi be the path from si to ti that
– first follows Oi until u,
– then Oi+1 (backwards) from u to si+1,
– then Ni+1 from si+1 to ti+1,
– then Oi+1 (backwards) from ti+1 to v,
– and finally Oi from v to ti.
In case Pi contains cycles, we skip them to obtain a simple path. It is easy to
verify that every edge on Pi either lies on Ni+1 or is not in Oi ∩Oi+1. Thus, Pi
has the desired property. In the following, let Qi denote the set of edges of Pi
that are also contained in E(O).
Since N is a Nash equilibrium, player i cannot improve her cost by choosing
path Pi. Therefore, costi(N) ≤ costi(Pi,N−i). If ke is the number of players using
edge e in N, this inequality amounts to∑
e∈Ni
ce
ke
≤
∑
e∈Pi∩Ni
ce
ke
+
∑
e∈Pi\Ni
ce
ke + 1
.
By the properties of Pi, the right-hand side of this inequality can be upper
bounded by ∑
e∈Qi
ce +
∑
e∈Ni+1∩Ni
ce
ke
+
∑
e∈Ni+1\Ni
ce
ke + 1
.
By shifting all terms not depending on Qi to the left-hand side of the resulting
inequality, we get ∑
e∈Ni\Ni+1
ce
ke
−
∑
e∈Ni+1\Ni
ce
ke + 1
≤
∑
e∈Qi
ce. (1)
We further consider another alternative strategy P̂i of player i. Path P̂i is
defined similarly as path Pi, but now with respect to player i − 1. That is, P̂i
uses the edges of Oi, Oi−1, and Ni−1 to connect si to ti and does not contain
any edges from Oi ∩Oi−1. Let Q̂i denote the set of edges of P̂i also contained
in E(O). Using the same arguments as above on P̂i we can derive an analogous
inequality as Inequality (1) for edges in Ni, Ni−1, and Q̂i, i.e, we get∑
e∈Ni\Ni−1
ce
ke
−
∑
e∈Ni−1\Ni
ce
ke + 1
≤
∑
e∈Q̂i
ce. (2)
Adding Inequalities (1) and (2), and then summing over all i gives
k∑
i=1
 ∑
e∈Ni\Ni+1
ce
ke
−
∑
e∈Ni+1\Ni
ce
ke + 1
+
∑
e∈Ni\Ni−1
ce
ke
−
∑
e∈Ni−1\Ni
ce
ke + 1

≤
k∑
i=1
∑
e∈Qi
ce +
∑
e∈Q̂i
ce
 . (3)
We bound the left-hand side and the right-hand side of Inequality (3) sepa-
rately, starting with the left-hand side. Since indices are modulo k, we may shift
the index in the second and the fourth sum on the left-hand side by, respectively,
substracting and adding one to the index. This lets us combine the first and the
fourth sum to ∑
e∈Ni\Ni+1
ce
ke
−
∑
e∈Ni\Ni+1
ce
ke + 1
=
∑
e∈Ni\Ni+1
ce
ke(ke + 1)
,
and analogously the second and the third sum to
∑
e∈Ni\Ni−1
ce
ke(ke+1)
, to obtain
k∑
i=1
∑
e∈Ni\Ni+1
ce
ke(ke + 1)
+
k∑
i=1
∑
e∈Ni\Ni−1
ce
ke(ke + 1)
.
Each of the two resulting sums counts each edge in E(N) \Nk at least once. This
is because for any edge e used by at least one player but not all of them, there is
a pair of players with consecutive indices (modulo k) such that e is used in N by
one of the players but not the other. Thus, we can lower bound the above term by
2
∑
e∈E(N)\Nk
ce
ke(ke + 1)
=
k−1∑
j=1
2
j(j + 1)
|Nj | ≥ 2
k(k − 1)
k−1∑
j=1
|Nj |,
which gives a lower-bound on the left-hand side of Inequality (3).
The right-hand side of Inequality (3) can be bounded by exploiting the major-
tree order of the players. We first only bound the sum depending on Qi. We
denote the two parts of Qi that lie in the larger and smaller parts of E(O) \Ok
by Q+i = Qi ∩O+ and Q−i = Qi ∩O−, respectively. Note that, by construction
of Pi, there are no edges of O
k in Qi. Thus, we get
k∑
i=1
∑
e∈Qi
ce =
k∑
i=1
∑
e∈Q+i
ce +
∑
e∈Q−i
ce
 .
By the defining property of the major-tree order, each edge in O+ is counted
exactly twice in the above sum, while each edge of O− is counted at most k times.
At the same time, the weight of the edges in O− amounts to at most half the
total weight of E(O) \Ok. Hence,
k∑
i=1
∑
e∈Q+i
ce +
∑
e∈Q−i
ce
 ≤ 2 ∑
e∈O+
ce + k
∑
e∈O−
ce = 2
∑
e∈E(O)\Ok
ce + (k − 2)
∑
e∈O−
ce
≤ (k/2 + 1)
∑
e∈E(O)\Ok
ce .
Analogously, we can derive a corresponding bound for the sum depending on Q̂i,
i.e.,
k∑
i=1
∑
e∈Q̂i
ce ≤ (k/2 + 1)
∑
e∈E(O)\Ok
ce .
Since the sum over all costs of edges in E(O) \Ok is exactly ∑k−1i=1 |Oj |, we can
bound the right-hand side of Inequality (3) by (k + 2)
∑k−1
i=1 |Oj |.
Together, the two derived bounds for the left-hand side and the right-hand
side of Inequality (3) give the claimed inequality. uunionsq
The following lemma encapsulates some technical calculations that allows to
derive an upper bound on the price of stability using Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. For a game G with social optimum O, let N be a Nash equilibrium
with Φ(N) ≤ Φ(O) and let β > 0 be such that ∑k−1j=1 |Nj | ≤ β∑k−1j=1 |Oj |. Then,
k∑
j=1
|Nj | ≤ βk
1 + βk
Hk ·
k∑
j=1
|Oj |.
Proof. We take 1 < α < Hk and compute
k∑
j=1
|Nj | ≤ α|Nk|+
k−1∑
j=1
|Nj | = α
Hk
·
k∑
j=1
Hj |Nj |+
k−1∑
j=1
(
1− αHj
Hk
)
|Nj |
≤ α
Hk
·
k∑
j=1
Hj |Nj |+
k−1∑
j=1
(
1− α
Hk
)
|Nj |.
Using that Φ(N) ≤ Φ(O) and the condition of the lemma, we introduce β to get
k∑
j=1
|Nj | ≤ α
Hk
·
k∑
j=1
Hj |Oj |+
(
1− α
Hk
)
· β
k−1∑
j=1
|Oj |
= α|Ok|+
k−1∑
j=1
[
α
Hj
Hk
+ β
(
1− α
Hk
)]
|Oj |
≤ α|Ok|+
k−1∑
j=1
[
α
Hk−1
Hk
+ β
(
1− α
Hk
)]
|Oj |. (4)
For α = βk1+βkHk we have
α
Hk−1
Hk
+ β
(
1− α
Hk
)
=
βk
1 + βk
Hk−1 + β
(
1− βk
1 + βk
)
=
βk
1 + βk
(
Hk − 1
k
)
+
β
1 + βk
= α. (5)
From (4) and (5) it follows that
k∑
j=1
|Nj | ≤ α|Ok|+ α
k−1∑
j=1
|Oj | = βk
1 + βk
Hk
k∑
j=1
|Oj |,
which concludes the proof. uunionsq
The above lemmas can be put together in order to show the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The potential-optimal price of anarchy POPoA(k) for Shapley
network design games with k ≥ 2 players is at most k3(k+1)/2−k21+k3(k+1)/2−k2Hk.
Proof. Let N be a potential minimum. If Ok 6= ∅, we may combine Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2 to obtain
cost(N)
cost(O)
≤ k
3(k + 1)/2− k2
1 + k3(k + 1)/2− k2Hk.
If, on the other hand, Ok = ∅, then obviously also |Ok| = 0. We show that
then cost(N) ≤ Hk−1cost(O) (which has been observed before for k = 3, e.g.,
by Christodoulou et al. [7]). We can express the potential functions of N and O
using Nj and Oj and use the fact that Φ(N) ≤ Φ(O) to obtain
k∑
j=1
|Nj | ≤
k∑
j=1
Hj |Nj | ≤
k∑
j=1
Hj |Oj | =
k−1∑
j=1
Hj |Oj | ≤ Hk−1
k∑
j=1
|Oj |.
Hence, in this case we get
cost(N)
cost(O)
≤ Hk−1 < k
3(k + 1)/2− k2
1 + k3(k + 1)/2− k2Hk.
In both cases, the cost of the Nash equilibrium is at most k
3(k+1)/2−k2
1+k3(k+1)/2−k2Hk
times the cost of the social optimum. uunionsq
We obtain the following corollary. Note that the bound is tight for k = 2.
Corollary 4. The price of stability PoS(k) for Shapley network design game
with k ≥ 2 players is at most k3(k+1)/2−k21+k3(k+1)/2−k2Hk.
4 Three-Player Games
The upper bound of k
3(k+1)/2−k2
1+k3(k+1)/2−k2Hk on the price of stability presented in the
previous section is valid for an arbitrary number of players. For the special case
of k = 3 players, it evaluates to 165/92 ≈ 1.793. For this case, however, better
bounds are known. Bilo` and Bove proved that the price of stability does not exceed
286/175 ≈ 1.634. For the proof of their result they combine inequalities that are
valid for any potential minimum of the game. Thus, their proof implies that also
the potential-optimal price of anarchy (and thus the potential-optimal price of
stability) is at most 286/175. As the main result of this section, we will show
that this result is tight. That is, there is a three-player game such that the cost
of the best potential minimum is 286/175 times the cost of the social optimum.
Theorem 5. For three players, the potential-optimal price of stability and the
potential-optimal price of anarchy are POPoA(3)=POPoS(3)=286/175≈1.634.
Proof. The upper bound of 286/175 on the potential-optimal price of anarchy
was proved by Bilo` and Bove [8, Theorem 3.1]. They derive the bound for the
potential-optimal price of anarchy, but only explicitly state the implied bound
for the (regular) price of stability.
Consider the three player game in Figure 2(a), and let  > 0 be sufficiently
small. The potential-optimal price of stability of this example approaches 286/175
when  tends to 0, which establishes tightness of the upper bound. It also shows
that the potential-optimal price of stability and the potential-optimal price of
anarchy coincide for the class of games with three players.
Obviously, any strategy profile in the example has to use at least three edges to
connect all terminal pairs. The three cheapest edges already connect all terminal
pairs and thus constitute the social optimum O of cost 700 + 3. It is easy to
verify that the underlying networks of Nash equilibria in the example do not
contain cycles, since at least one edge of each cycle would be abandoned by
all players. Hence, all Nash equilibria in the example use exactly three edges.
We show that the unique potential minimum N uses the three edges not used
t1,t3 t2
s1,s2 s3
209 + ǫ
209 + ǫ
396 282 + ǫ
3
7
4
3
7
4
(a)
t1,t3 t2
s1
s2 s3
318
54
9
113
277
418
5
5
6
6
6
4
(b)
Fig. 2. (a) A three-player game with POPoS and POPoA approaching 286/175 ≈ 1.634
for → 0. (b) A three-player game with PoS = 1769/1126 ≈ 1.571.
in O (note that O itself is a Nash equilibrium). This profile has both a potential-
function value and cost equal to 396 + 2 · 374 = 1144, since every edge is used
by one player only. In contrast, the social optimum has a potential-function
value of 2H2 · (209 + ) + H3 · (282 + ) > 1144. If the edge {t2, s3} is used in
a Nash equilibrium, the other two edges have to be used by at least two players
each. For profiles other than O, this gives a potential function value of at least
H2 · (209+ +374)+(282+ ) > 1156. If the edges with cost 396 and (282+ ) are
both unused, all three players use an edge of cost 374 and the resulting potential
value is either H3 ·374+H2 ·(209+)+(209+) > 1208 or H2 ·374+374+(209+) >
1144. Equilibria that use one edge each of costs (209 + ), 374, 396 have a
potential function value of H2 · 396 + 374 + (209 + ) > 1177. And finally, the
profile using both cheap edges together with the one of cost 396 has a potential of
H3·396+2·(209+) > 1144. We conclude that the potential minimum is as claimed.
For  tending to 0, the ratio between the cost of N and O approaches 286/175. uunionsq
Our result in particular implies that it is impossible to push the upper
bound on the price of stability for three-player Shapley network design games on
undirected networks below 286/175 by using inequalities that are only valid for
global minima of the potential function. Note that the example in Figure 2(a)
has a price of stability of 1, since its social optimum is itself a Nash equilibrium.
So far, the best lower bound on the price of stability for three-player games
was 74/48 ≈ 1.542 [7]. We can slightly improve this bound by presenting a game
with three players whose price of stability is 1769/1126 ≈ 1.571. Consider the
network with 5 vertices shown in Figure 2(b). By exhaustive enumeration of
all strategy profiles, one can verify that only the strategy profile in which each
player i uses the edge (si, ti) is a Nash equilibrium. The social optimum uses
all other edges and has a cost of 1126, while the unique Nash equilibrium has a
cost of 1769. This establishes the claimed lower bound on the price of stability in
undirected Shapley network design games with three players.
5 Conclusions
We gave an upper bound for the price of stability for an arbitrary number of
players k in undirected graphs. Our bound is smaller than Hk for every k and
tight for two players. For three players, we showed that the upper bound of
286/175 ≈ 1.634 by Bilo` and Bove [8] is tight for both the potential-optimal price
of stability and anarchy. We also improved the lower bound to 1769/1126 ≈ 1.571
for the price of stability in this case.
Asymptotically, a wide gap remains between the upper bound of the price
of stability that is of order log k, and the best known lower bound construction
by Bilo` et al. [5] that approaches the constant 348/155 ≈ 2.245. It is unclear
where the correct answer lies within this gap, in particular since bounds of
O(log k/ log log k) [9] and O(log log k) [6] emerge for restrictions of the problem.
Our bound approaches Hk for a growing number of players k. It would already be
interesting to know whether the price of stability is asymptotically below Hk−c
or Hk/c for some (or even any) positive constant c ∈ N.
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